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*692 I. Introduction
The 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction has, over the course of its nearly thirty years
in federal and state courts, generated unanticipated challenges to the constitutional balance struck between Congress
and the federal judiciary with respect to the scope of the Constitution's “judicial power” as well as more routine tests
respecting state courts' capacity and inclination to respect the United States' international obligations. 1 The treaty
addressed a common and growing problem facing the international community: parents taking their children across
international borders in an attempt to obtain more favorable custody determinations. 2 The treaty aimed to deprive the
abducting parent of any advantage by requiring the return of the child, and in the case of visitation rights, to ensure
respect for those rights. 3 The United States signed the treaty in 1981 and Congress passed an implementing statute, the
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International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), in 1988. 4 ICARA gave federal and state courts concurrent
original jurisdiction over treaty claims and required them to respect each other's judgments. 5
*693 In previous work, I examined state and federal courts' behavior with respect to adjudicating the rights of parents
seeking the return of their children under the treaty, finding that not only did state and federal courts order return at
nearly similar rates, but that they granted and denied affirmative defenses under the treaty at similar rates as well. 6
Nevertheless, federal appellate courts had demonstrated an overwhelming hostility to district court orders that abstained
from parallel state proceedings, based largely on distrust of state court competence and neutrality. 7 In the course of
that study, I also discovered that while federal courts jealously guarded their jurisdiction over the remedy of return,
they had done precisely the opposite with respect to rights of access or “visitation” as they would be more commonly
understood in the United States. 8 That is, instead of asserting jurisdiction over access claims even over parallel state
court proceedings, federal courts largely concluded that they had no jurisdiction over access claims at all.
This article explores this discrepancy in the law of federal jurisdiction as it has developed under the Hague Child
Abduction Convention. 9 In contrast to return claims where the remedy is discrete, finite, and closely tied to fundamental
international obligations under the treaty, orders to enforce access rights are, or would be, amorphous, ongoing, and
subject to other administrative structures codified in the convention as well as, in the U.S. system, adding responsibilities
for federal judges more generally associated with those undertaken by state judges. 10 Even in the one federal appellate
decision that explicitly acknowledged a judicially enforceable right to ensure access, the court fashioned the remedy
toward return, ultimately rendering that part of the decision dicta. 11 In any case, federal courts have overwhelmingly
rejected jurisdiction over access claims, emphasizing state courts' role in making child custody determinations and
alternative treaty *694 mechanisms like cooperation between executive branch officials. 12
Ultimately, this article argues that there is little if any support in the language of the Hague Child Abduction Convention
or in its implementing statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, to justify federal courts' refusal to
hear access claims. Rather, the rationales adopted by federal courts in allocating access cases to state courts resurrects
a long-standing problem in the law of federal jurisdiction: Is the exception to federal jurisdiction for matters relating
to divorce, maintenance, and child custody based on courts' interpretation of jurisdictional statutes or did Article Ill's
jurisdictional grant to “cases” or “controversies” always exclude matters traditionally handled by ecclesiastical courts
in 1787 Britain? 13 While this article takes no position on that problem directly, it does suggest that federal courts
have appropriated to themselves authority to determine jurisdiction based on their own assessment of state courts'
competencies, what is called here a “latent” domestic relations exception to federal question jurisdiction.
The judicial federalism problem posed by these decisions is that, statutory parity notwithstanding, federal appellate
courts are shaping jurisdiction under the treaty based on an implied Article III power to uphold the United States'
international obligations, but interpreting those obligations in light of historical zones of competency between state and
federal courts, not according to Congress' plan. 14 In their view, state courts, not federal, deal with visitation. 15 In the
long term, the process by which federal appellate courts have shaped state jurisdiction under the treaty is likely to disrupt
the perception of U.S. compliance with the treaty regime--creating a binary system whereby parents seeking return of a
child may resort to federal judicial authorities but everything else must be *695 adjudicated or managed elsewhere. 16
This argument implicates a wider theoretical debate on the law of federal jurisdiction in the treaty context generally as
well as more immediate, practical questions about the effectiveness of ICARA's jurisdictional scheme--questions that
are especially important to resolve in light of the family law treaties now awaiting ratification and implementation. 17
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Part I of this article provides background to the increasing influence of international law on judicial authority generally
and the United States' increased engagement with international family law treaties specifically. Part II analyzes federal
judicial decisions under the Hague Child Abduction Convention, showing that notwithstanding statutory parity, federal
courts have shaped jurisdiction under the treaty so as to retain expansive, and exclusive, jurisdiction over return claims
while allocating access or visitation claims to state courts or to the U.S. State Department. While rationales supporting
these decisions have some relationship to the treaty text and implementing statute, the orders and decisions also go to
some length to discuss the competency of other actors such as state courts. Part III applies the lesson of Hague Child
Abduction Convention jurisdiction-shaping to family law treaties the United States has either signed or already ratified.
Part IV takes stock of recent U.S. participation in family law treaties and provides a glimpse into how federal judicial
behavior may complicate both family law and commercial treaties that the United States is now preparing to join.
*696 II. The Increasing Influence of International Law on the Scope of the Constitutional “Judicial Power” and the
Implementation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention 18
A. Constitutional Structure and Federal Treaties
To understand the difficulties raised by the Hague Child Abduction Convention, it is necessary to review the
constitutional framework for the implementation of treaties and the spread of international law into spheres historically
regulated by states. 19 The U.S. Constitution originated in significant part because the Articles of Confederation
condoned competition and conflict between the states in ways that threatened long-term unity and invited external
interference. 20 The Founders, as part of a comprehensive if not total displacement of state sovereignty over foreign
relations, stripped away the states' powers to conclude treaties and regulate foreign commerce and vested those powers in
Congress and the President. 21 For example, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate
foreign commerce and to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, while Section 10 prohibits states from
“enter[ing] into any treaty, alliance, or confederation”; Article II provides for a joint treaty-making process between
the President and the Senate. 22 Under the Articles of Confederation, states were prohibited from entering into any
“agreement or compact” with a *697 foreign power or engaging in war without Congressional consent. 23
Article Ill's enumerated classes of Supreme Court jurisdiction established federal judicial control over disputes most
likely to affect international relations. 24 For example, maritime and admiralty disputes were fundamentally tied to both
commercial and security interests of the United States as a unitary sovereign under the law of nations. 25 Article III,
Section 2 specifically extended the “judicial power” to “treaties,” “all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls,” and cases “between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” 26 Thus, the
judicial power was always intertwined with the United States' international obligations.
Article VI of the Constitution binds state judiciaries to give effect to actions taken by the political branches in executing
these functions. 27 However, initial state judicial resistance to the enforcement of British creditors' treaty-based rights
after independence established a long tradition of skepticism about whether state judges would robustly enforce
international commitments--especially when doing so threatened important state interests. 28 When states threatened
the United States' international obligations through executive, legislative, or judicial action, federal judges readily
invalidated those measures by applying one of several doctrines of conflict or field preemption flowing from Article VI. 29
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*698 To prevent the abuse of international-lawmaking powers, the Founders built both explicit and implicit safeguards
into the Constitution. 30 Explicitly, states enjoyed participation in Congress through their elected delegations--the
“political safeguards of federalism” which protected state interests when Congress, for example, regulated foreign
commerce or codified customary international law. 31 With respect to treaties, for example, a super-majority of Senators
(then elected by state legislatures) were required to approve agreements entered into by the President. 32 Implicitly, it
was understood that treaties covered a relatively narrow class of national interests, limiting the areas for which this
non-bicameral form of law-making might be used. 33 The judiciary fashioned its own methods to enforce that implicit
understanding, *699 principally the doctrine of “self-execution” 34 under which courts determined whether or not
treaties required additional action from Congress to have domestic legal effect. 35
Historical, geopolitical, and constitutional changes have pressured this relatively strong set of safeguards. 36 The
Civil War (and the Reconstruction Amendments that followed) shifted the center of lawmaking authority from state
governments to the national government. 37 Diminishing barriers to the international movement of goods and people
encouraged the national government to enter into a greater number of bilateral and multilateral agreements that
coordinated, protected, and regulated interests implicated by these movements. 38 These international agreements
inevitably influenced traditional areas of state authority. 39 In 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Missouri v. Holland,
that the federal government could accomplish through treaty what the *700 Constitution otherwise allocated to the
states. 40 In Zschernig v. Miller, 41 later reaffirmed on narrower preemption grounds in American Insurance Association
v. Garamendi, state statutes and administrative measures face a significant risk of preemption if they impose more than
an “incidental effect” on foreign relations, even where they do not directly conflict with a treaty or federal statute. 42
In its most recent decision in the treaty-making context, the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly endorsed Congress' broad
authority to invade the historical province of state regulation when adopting implementing legislation, requiring only
that it do so explicitly. 43
B. U.S. Engagement with Family Law Treaties
Family law is an area over which states have historically enjoyed virtually unfettered authority. 44 Diplomatically, the
United States protected state family law either through reservations, understandings, and declarations stating that any
international agreement was subject to principles of federalism or by rejecting agreements which overstepped traditional
understandings of the division between federal and state authority. 45 This was especially true of family law treaties, 46
which had long been a focus of the *701 Hague Conference on Private International Law, an international organization
committed to the harmonization and unification of choice-of-law rules. 47
Major federal interventions into family law arose in part because some states abused this authority, giving little or no
deference to family adjudications in other states, creating precisely the kind of full faith and credit problem the federal
constitution was designed to address. 48 Aggrieved parents absconded with their children to haven states in search of
a more favorable custody or maintenance determination. 49 Judicially mandated child and family support obligations
also emerged as an important barrier between self-sufficiency and eligibility for federal assistance.
Over the last three decades, the federal government has increasingly regulated family law with a range of mandatory
and permissive legal regimes aimed at these federal interests. 50 For example, citing the relationship between delinquent
family maintenance obligations and federal welfare assistance, Congress imposed a mandatory regime that requires
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

4

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF..., 41 N.C. J. Int'l L. 691

states to actively pursue individuals who are delinquent in family maintenance payments. 51 *702 With respect to child
custody decisions, Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) to eliminate haven states by
requiring state judges to defer to the continuing jurisdiction of any decree issued by a previous state judge with jurisdiction
over the case. 52 The PKPA makes the Federal Parent Locator Service available in all custody cases and makes the
federal Fugitive Felony Act applicable to interstate child abductions. 53
The two interests that caused the federalization of certain aspects of family law domestically--recovery of maintenance
obligations and elimination of haven states--also necessitated protection at the international level. 54 As marriages
between people from different countries became more common and families became more mobile, so did the need to reach
parents in foreign countries when those marriages ended. 55 As a result, the executive branch has shown greater openness
to participation in treaties previously *703 regarded as excessively intrusive into states' family law authority. 56 The
United States has ratified the Hague Child Abduction Convention as well as the Convention on Protection of Children
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. 57
The United States has signed, but not ratified, two additional treaties that upon adoption would regulate important
aspects of state family law: the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children; 58 and the Convention on
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. 59 The purpose of the first *704
treaty is to protect children over whom citizenship, residency, and parental rights involve more than one state, and to
“[avoid] conflicts between their legal systems in respect of jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of
measures for the protection of children” through international cooperation and promotion of the “best interests of the
child.” 60 The second treaty aims to effectuate the “recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance” in
the international setting by establishing a system of cooperation between the contracting states, which will ensure that
they make available applications for child support and other forms of family maintenance, recognize child support and
other family maintenance orders, and effectively enforce the orders when necessary. 61 While it is certainly true that these
treaties may be effected through adoption on a state-by-state basis, Congress would retain authority to adopt national
legislation as non-uniform interpretation or other problems arise with disaggregated implementation.
C. The Hague Child Abduction Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
Drafted in response to the growing phenomenon of parents in domestic disputes taking children across international
borders in order to prejudice custody determinations, the Hague Child Abduction Convention requires the return of a
child who was living in one party state, but was removed to or retained in another party state in violation of the leftbehind parent's custodial rights. 62 Once returned, child custody can then be resolved in the courts of that jurisdiction. 63
The Hague Child Abduction Convention does not authorize a court to determine the merits of the underlying custody
claim. 64 The court is limited to deciding whether the child should be returned to his or her state of habitual residence. 65
The Hague *705 Child Abduction Convention divides parental rights into “rights of custody” and “rights of access.” 66
Article 3 of the treaty by its terms limits a “wrongful” removal to one violating “rights of custody.” 67 The Hague Child
Abduction Convention does not mandate any specific remedy when a noncustodial parent has established interference
with rights of access. 68 Rather, nations are instructed in Article 21 to “promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights
and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject,” as well as to “take steps to
remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.” 69 Article 29 *706 provides that:
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This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or body who claims that there has been a breach
of custody or access rights within the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from applying directly to the judicial or
administrative authorities of a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this Convention. 70

The Reagan Administration, which signed the treaty, argued that claims brought under the treaty belonged exclusively
in state courts because key aspects of the treaty implicated state expertise and state interests. 71 The original House bill,
H.R. 3971, gave state courts jurisdiction over all actions requesting the return of an abducted child and vested federal
district courts with jurisdiction “to the extent” a question of treaty interpretation or diversity of citizenship arose. 72 The
Senate, however, included concurrent, original federal and state jurisdiction both in its initial version of the law and as
an amendment to the version eventually passed by both chambers. 73
Both chambers were clear that the purpose of making state and federal courts equally available was to facilitate U.S.
compliance with its obligations under the treaty. 74 Then-Representative Ben Cardin emphasized:
[W]e have no intention of expanding Federal court jurisdiction into the realm of family law. In fact,
Congress reaffirms its view that States have traditionally had, and continue to have, *707 jurisdiction and
expertise in the area of family law. Here we are not intruding into this jurisdiction. Rather, we are simply
providing through simple and unambiguous language that in the special circumstance where international
child abduction is alleged, both the Federal and State courts should be available to resolve the claims. As
a matter of fact, the State courts will often provide the best fora for these cases because their backlogs are
often substantially less than those of the Federal courts in many parts of the country. 75

Senator Orrin Hatch noted the treaty's “custody-related questions” were “traditionally ... handled by the states,” but
encouraged passage of the law despite the “close question” of federal or state jurisdiction. 76 Congress appeared to
embody this intent with 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g), which provides that:
Full faith and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the States and the courts of the United States to the
judgment of any other such court ordering or denying the return of a child, pursuant to the Convention,
in an action brought under this chapter. 77

Congress also authorized courts to enter provisional remedies to prevent harm to children and prejudice to parental
rights:
Limitation on authority. No court exercising jurisdiction of an action ... may ... order a child removed from
a person having physical control of the child unless the applicable requirements of State law are satisfied. 78

The implementing legislation additionally directed the president to establish a “Central Authority” for cooperating with
other contracting states with respect to upholding treaty obligations, reporting to Congress and the Hague Conference,
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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and coordinating across agencies. 79 ICARA's principal purpose, however, is to regulate judicial proceedings under the
treaty. 80
*708 ICARA was unambiguous as to the availability of a right of action in a state or federal court for both return
and access claims:
(1) A petitioner in an action brought under [the treaty] shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence--

(A) in the case of an action for the return of a child, that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained
within the meaning of the Convention; and
(B) in the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access, that the petitioner has such rights.

(2) In the case of an action for the return of a child, a respondent who opposes the return of the child has
the burden of establishing-(A) by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in article 13b or 20 of the
Convention applies; and

(B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set forth in article 12 or 13 of the
Convention applies. 81

Under ICARA, any person seeking the return of a child may commence a civil action by filing a petition in a court
authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the place where the child is located. 82 ICARA grants to state courts and U.S.
district courts “concurrent *709 original jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention.” 83 The statute made
only modest modifications to the treaty text, requiring simply that courts “shall decide the case in accordance with the
Convention.” 84
Under the treaty, judges may refuse to order the return of a child through two principal means. Article 3 of the Hague
Child Abduction Convention gives left-behind parents a right to have a child returned if: (1) a child's removal from a
contracting state is “wrongful” and (2) the removal “is in breach of rights of custody.” 85 Judges may therefore render the
treaty inapplicable by determining that a removal was not “wrongful” or that a left-behind parent did not have “rights
of custody,” which are characterized (but not defined) in the treaty. For example, if a court determines that a left-behind
parent's rights are actually rights of visitation, and not custody, then the parent would not have a right to have a child
returned. Similarly, if a taking parent traveled to a foreign country with a child, a left-behind parent would not have a
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right to have the child returned if a judge determined that the taking parent was traveling with the consent of the leftbehind parent or pursuant to a custody agreement because the removal would not be “wrongful.” 86
Assuming the treaty applies and a left-behind parent has established a wrongful removal in breach of rights of custody,
judges still might not order removal under one of the aforementioned affirmative defenses. For example, if a left-behind
parent fails to prosecute a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim in a year and the court determines that the child
had settled in his or her new environment, the treaty permits the court to refuse to return the child. 87 A judge may also
refuse return where a parent shows by clear and convincing evidence that the other parent acquiesced in the removal,
or that the removal would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child of placing the child in an
“intolerable situation,” or would violate the repatriating *710 state's view of human rights or fundamental freedoms. 88

III. Federal Courts' Shaping of Jurisdiction Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention 89
Hague Child Abduction Convention petitioners may file with the U.S. State Department as well as raise a treaty claim
before a state and/or federal court. 90 Indeed, part of the problem with the treaty as it functions in the United States is
that petitioners often file in all three of these uncoordinated fora. 91 In Part A, I summarize my previous work, which
identified the mechanisms federal courts used to crowd out state court jurisdiction over return claims. In Part B, I analyze
an aspect of federal court behavior raised in my previous article, but more fully developed here: the allocation of visitation
claims to state courts.
A. Federal Courts' Extensive Reach over Removal Claims
ICARA invites jurisdictional tensions between state courts, where Hague Child Abduction Convention claims are
brought in conjunction with divorce and child custody actions, and federal courts, where state court defendants may
bring original actions as federal plaintiffs. 92 Litigants have exploited this procedural structure to introduce treaty claims
at the state court level, and then use federal court litigation to re-litigate unfavorable state court orders. 93
1. Rejection of District Court Abstention
Where Hague Child Abduction Convention claims appear in state litigation, federal district courts have used both
formal and informal methods to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction. In *711 Aldogan v. Aldogan, for example, the
federal district court held a hearing in order to determine if either party objected to a state family court having the first
opportunity to decide the Hague Child Abduction Convention claim because the court already had jurisdiction over
the underlying child custody suit. 94 Both parties assented to the transfer. 95 Federal district courts have also applied
formal abstention doctrines permitting, and in some circumstances requiring, deference to state court proceedings. 96
Based on the statutory scheme, and where other criteria are met, dismissal in favor of state adjudication would not
appear to threaten federal interests under the treaty. 97 Certainly, where state court proceedings have advanced beyond
the pleading stage, avoidance of duplication and waste as well as comity and federalism concerns would weigh in favor
of dismissal. 98 These represent the contexts in which federal district courts have declined jurisdiction in favor of state
family, juvenile, or general trial court proceedings, roughly corresponding to Colorado River, Rooker-Feldman, and
Younger abstention (the U.S. Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to state civil proceedings in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 99 and state family law proceedings in Moore v. Sims 100 ). 101
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*712 Federal district courts have often referred to state interests in child custody adjudication as the state interest
justifying abstention. It is almost certainly true that a state's interest in an initial custody determination is insufficient to
justify abstention. Child custody determinations are, by nature, case specific. In any event, the Hague Child Abduction
Convention bars final decisions on the merits of custody disputes until the removal claim is resolved. 102 Yet arguably,
child custody inquiries frequently implicate other more relevant state schemes for assessing a child's maturity and risk of
psychological or physical harm as well as use of temporary or foster care pending resolution of Hague Child Abduction
Convention or custody claims. 103 With respect to custody arrangements in which state courts have already established
original and continuing jurisdiction, state interests in those determinations are more developed. 104 These factors matter
because abstention decisions under Younger and Colorado River frequently turn on the presence of state interests or
the application of state law in parallel state proceedings. 105 In addition to safeguarding state interests in family law
schemes and in the administration of their judicial systems, *713 abstention furthers treaty interests in the efficacious
adjudication of removal claims. 106 Federal district courts have abstained under these doctrines to preserve state interests
in maintaining the integrity of their judicial systems and their interests in using dependency systems to protect minors
from abuse. 107
While there are many examples of abstention in the treaty context, two serve to illustrate the reasons that federal district
courts abstain, and the corresponding hostility federal appellate courts have shown toward those abstention orders. In
Barzilay v. Barzilay, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, entered a divorce decree that dissolved the marriage
between two Israeli citizens, Sagi and Tamar Barzilay, and provided joint custody for their three minor children. 108 The
Barzilays had moved to Missouri in 2001 and divorced in 2005. 109 The children had lived in Missouri since 2001; the
younger two had never lived in Israel. 110 During the children's visit to Israel in 2006, Sagi Barzilay secured an order
from an Israeli court prohibiting the children's return to the United States. He then used the court order to secure a
modified visitation schedule with the children and an agreement from Tamar to repatriate them to Israel by August
2009. 111 When she returned to the United States, she filed a petition with the Circuit Court of St. Louis County to
modify the divorce decree to restrict Sagi's access to the minor children based in-part on the Hague Child Abduction
Convention. 112 Sagi filed a motion to dismiss Tamar's state petition also based on the treaty. 113 One day after the state
court determined *714 that the children's habitual residence was the United States, denying Sagi's ICARA claim, Sagi
filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, requesting return of the children to Israel. 114
The federal district court dismissed the claim, concluding that the final state court order left Sagi's only available course
of action to be an appeal in the Missouri courts. 115 Although the district court did not specifically invoke Younger,
and, indeed, the procedural history suggests the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court focused
on the presence of the Hague Child Abduction Convention issues in an ongoing state custody proceeding, the relatively
flagrant attempt to undermine the state custody determination through the use of foreign judicial process, and Congress'
clear intent that state courts share jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction Convention claims with federal courts. 116
The Eighth Circuit reversed, adopting a per se rule that abstention was inappropriate in Hague Child Abduction
Convention cases. 117 The Eighth Circuit appeared aware of the tension between the state court judgment and its own
refusal to affirm the abstention decision:
Tamar stated that Sagi used the Israeli court system “to fraudulently procure a judgment giving Israel
exclusive jurisdiction over the custody of the minor children ... in blatant defiance of ... the Hague Treaty
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on Child Abduction.” She did not reference the terms of the Hague treaty or explain how Sagi's *715 use
of the Israeli court system implicated the treaty. In her motion for a temporary restraining order, Tamar
argued that the Israeli judgment ... should have deferred to the Missouri court given its existing custody
judgment and the habitual residence of the children. She also complained that Sagi's use of the Israeli court
system “violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Hague Convention. 118

The decision turned in significant part on the role of federal courts in upholding international commitments:
Moreover, given that Sagi obtained a custody determination from an Israeli court and Tamar has obtained
a custody determination from a state court in this country, the federal district court is uniquely situated to
adjudicate the question of whether Israel or Missouri is the habitual residence of the Barzilay children and
whether they were wrongfully removed from that residence. Although the state clearly has an important
interest in child custody matters, that interest has not been considered to be a significant factor in terms of
abstention where ICARA is involved. 119

It is not clear why a federal district court judge would be better “situated” to determine the habitual residence of
children where domestic and foreign custody orders conflict--a situation state courts face with some frequency and to
which federal courts hearing claims based on diversity of citizenship apply the “domestic relations” exception to federal
jurisdiction over divorce, maintenance, and child custody. 120 In a separate action, the Eighth Circuit determined that
Rooker-Feldman, which bars federal *716 appellate review of state court orders, did not apply under the treaty. 121
In Holder v. Holder, Jeremiah Holder sought the return of his children to Germany, where he was stationed with the
U.S. Army. 122 His wife, Carla, had left Germany with their two sons during what he thought to be a vacation in
Washington State. 123 Jeremiah filed for divorce and custody in California, where he and Carla had met and where their
two children had been born. 124 The California court ordered mediation regarding a custody and visitation plan. 125
Jeremiah consented to the arrangement proposed by the mediator, which provided Carla with custody of the children
in Washington and became part of the state trial court custody order on August 9, 2000. 126 Jeremiah then obtained
new counsel and filed a motion to reconsider the California order. 127 At the hearing for reconsideration, Jeremiah's
counsel informed the state court that he had filed a Hague Child Abduction Convention petition with the U.S. State
Department, to which the state court judge noted that Carla would be allowed to brief and argue the Hague claim since
Holder had raised it. 128 The trial court raised the Hague Child Abduction Convention issue four times in the course of
the reconsideration hearing, and each time, Holder's counsel refused to discuss the claim. 129
Jeremiah then filed a Hague Child Abduction Convention petition in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington at the same time that he appealed the initial California *717 custody order. 130 In the petition, he asserted
that Germany was the children's habitual residence under the treaty and that therefore German courts should adjudicate
custody. 131 The federal district judge abstained under Colorado River, determining that California state courts had
obtained jurisdiction before the U.S. district court, and that the litigation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention
claim in Washington would be both inconvenient and result in piecemeal litigation. 132 While the treaty was federal law,
Congress had vested both federal and state courts with original jurisdiction over treaty claims. 133 Under California
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waiver law, Holder had abandoned his treaty claim when he failed to bring it with his divorce and custody action. 134
“Comity and federalism” required deference to the California judgment because Holder had used the treaty to get a
“second bite at the custody apple.” 135
The Ninth Circuit rejected the federal district court abstention order, even though the California state appellate panel
had considered the views of the United States as amicus on the Hague Convention claim. 136 The decision forced
litigation in both California state court and Washington federal court--a result that weighed against the convenience
of the federal forum and consolidated litigation. 137 The Ninth Circuit determined that it need not apply “general res
judicata principles” where “the implementation of federal statutes representing countervailing and compelling federal
policies justifies departures from a strict application.” 138 Similarly, the majority held that Rooker-Feldman *718 did
not apply in the Hague Child Abduction Convention context because “Congress has expressly granted the federal courts
jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention. Thus, federal courts must have the power to vacate state
custody determinations and other state court orders that contravene the treaty.” 139
This conclusion sits uneasily with the statutory language. ICARA established concurrent original jurisdiction between
federal and state courts. 140 The full faith and credit provision does not establish a hierarchy between federal and
state courts; instead, it requires horizontal parity between state judgments and vertical parity between federal and state
courts. 141 As the United States noted in its amicus brief in Holder, the full faith and credit provision was included
because a court may exercise jurisdiction over a treaty claim even where the children are physically located elsewhere. 142
The statute simply confirmed that a second action was unnecessary. 143 Also, Congress vested federal district courts
with original jurisdiction, leaving in place Rooker-Feldmari's admonition to lower federal courts to not exercise appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments. 144
The Holder dissent noted that the federal plaintiff, an American citizen, plainly used his federal petition to undermine
an unfavorable custody judgment issued by the California forum he had chosen--a result not only inconsistent with the
treaty's purpose, *719 but also only justifiable by subordinating state courts to federal courts in the resolution of Hague
Child Abduction Convention claims. 145
Congress' plan to distribute treaty jurisdiction between state and federal courts mirrors several aspects of the distribution
of authority that led to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River. 146 Particularly in cases that have been
extensively adjudicated in state courts, Colorado River strongly suggests that federal courts should dismiss petitions filed
by state court parties in parallel litigation. 147
Whatever the balance federal district courts have attempted to strike while weighing state interests and judicial economy
with federal interests in treaty commitments, federal appellate courts have been overwhelmingly hostile to abstention
decisions. 148 Every *720 federal appellate court before which Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstentions have been
raised has rejected them. 149 Indeed, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted per se rules prohibiting
the application of Rooker-Feldman. 150 The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have announced per se rules barring
Younger abstention. 151 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alone has affirmed a district court abstention decision
based on Colorado River, but more recently has affirmed a district court decision to deny both Colorado River and
Younger abstentions based on reasoning similar to that adopted by other federal appellate courts. 152
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To be sure, ICARA vests a party with the option to raise his or her claim in either federal or state court. 153 The treaty
also prohibits a court from adjudicating the merits of a custody suit pending the resolution of the wrongful removal
claim. 154 So, even if a state court plaintiff initiates divorce and child custody proceedings, the state court defendant
may bring a separate action in federal court. These circumstances, without more, might not justify abstention. Indeed,
the Third Circuit in Yang v. Tsui explained the pattern in federal appellate decisions not by which the sovereign was
better able to enforce international obligations, but by whether or not a Hague Convention petition had been filed in
state court. 155 In Yang, the Third Circuit could rightly point to the fact that not only had no party raised a Hague
Convention petition in the underlying state custody proceeding, but that a final judgment had been entered resolving the
entire custody dispute and thus no specter of a Hague *721 claim in state court existed. 156
2. Assertion of Federal Jurisdiction Based on Federal Judiciary's Role in Upholding International Obligations
Federal appellate decisions have rejected abstention even in cases where a left-behind parent initially selected a state
forum or substantially engaged state judicial process in pursuance of a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim. 157
Article 8 of the Treaty specifies the information required of a return application to a central authority, but Congress
made no association between those requirements and pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 158 Congress
included only a permissive provision regarding a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim, noting that a claimant
“may ... [file] a petition for the relief sought in any court which has jurisdiction ....” 159 The State Department's legal
analysis suggests that applicants provide as much information to a court as Article 8 requires, but notes “the informal
nature of the pleading and proof requirements; Article 8(c) merely requires a statement in the application to the Central
Authority as to ‘the grounds on which the applicant's claim for return of the child is based.”’ 160 Federal appellate
courts, however, have adopted fatal *722 scrutiny in cases where a federal district court abstained without a Hague
Child Abduction Convention claim being brought in the form recommended in Annex A to the State Department's legal
analysis. 161
The recurrent theme in federal appellate decisions is that--Congress's explicit grant of concurrent original jurisdiction
notwithstanding-- responsibility for upholding international obligations is a fundamental function of the federal
courts. 162 These decisions are relatively vague as to which federal treaty interests need protecting--uniformity in
interpretation, reciprocity between contracting states, or the treaty provisions that federal courts are uniquely able to
adjudicate and enforce. 163 The emphasis is instead on the general constitutional entrustment of treaty obligations to
the federal courts and skepticism that state courts will respect the United States' international commitments.
In its one decision addressing abstention under the Hague Child Abduction Convention--a case in which the federal
plaintiff was convicted of murdering the children's mother, fleeing to Mexico, and violating numerous state court orders
regarding the custody of his children in the process--the Sixth Circuit did not engage in any extensive analysis of the
appellants' abstention claim, but hinted *723 that it would be disinclined to defer to state court proceedings. 164 “We
find the circumstances surrounding the entry of this default, like the circumstances surrounding the Tennessee contempt
orders, highly unusual, and suggestive of the home court advantage that the treaty was designed to correct.” 165
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit rejected district court abstention on the basis that:
It was to curb [international parental kidnapping] that the United States assumed a treaty obligation
to cooperate with other nations states to adopt a mutual policy in favor of restoring the status quo by
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means of the prompt return of abducted children to the country of their habitual residence and in this way
depriving custody decrees of states to which a parent has removed a child “of any practical or juridical
consequences.” Indeed, although the state to which the child has been taken no doubt has an important
interest in adjudicating the custody of a child within its borders, it now shares, with the other states of the
Union, an even more important interest in ensuring that its courts are not used to escape the strictures
of a custody decree already rendered by another nation-state or to otherwise interfere with the custody
rights that a parent enjoys under the law of another country. We hold, therefore, in agreement with the
other Circuits that have confronted the issue, that a Hague petition simply does not implicate the Younger
abstention doctrine. 166

While the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted per se rules against the Younger abstention, the Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have implicitly foreclosed the Colorado River abstention. 167
*724 B. Federal Courts' Rejection of Visitation Claims
While federal courts, especially appellate courts, have rejected the application of abstention doctrines in the case of
parallel state proceedings and asserted their primacy with respect to federal law that implicates the United States'
international obligations, they have allocated claims to enforce “access” or “visitation” rights to state courts and, to a
lesser extent, the U.S. State Department, also in tension with the Congressional jurisdictional plan for the treaty. 168
1. Allocation of Visitation Claims to State Courts
On November 23, 1998, ten years after the adoption of ICARA, Robert Paul Bromley filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking enforcement of his visitation rights only. 169 Until that
time, the fifty or so Hague Child Abduction Convention cases had involved only removal or associated actions like
requests for attorneys' fees. Under the facts of that case, the plaintiff sought the enforcement of his visitation rights as
decreed by a Texas court (the defendant, and custodial mother, had moved to Pennsylvania, while the plaintiff-father
had moved to the United Kingdom). 170 The court emphasized Article 21 of the Convention, which specifies that “[a]n
application to make arrangements for [organizing] or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be presented
to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application for the return of a child.” 171
While Article 21 suggests a prominent role for “Central Authorities” and international cooperation, it refers explicitly to
that cooperation in “proceedings” aimed at ensuring access. 172 That access rights are available through judicial action
is made clearer in Article 29, which provides that the Hague Child *725 Abduction Convention:
shall not preclude any person, institution or body who claims that there has been a breach of custody or
access rights within the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from applying directly to the judicial or administrative
authorities of a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this Convention. 173

Convention text aside, Congress had clearly intended for federal courts to hear access claims under ICARA, requiring
that “in the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access, that
the petitioner has such rights.” 174
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But the district court went further, implying that the plaintiff's complaint was inextricably intertwined with underlying
custody issues under the Texas decree:
From a policy perspective, the refusal of federal courts to hear child custody matters makes sense. This
court finds that the arena of child custody matters, except for the limited matters of international abduction
expressly addressed by the Convention, would better be handled by the state courts which are more
numerous and have both the experience and resources to deal with this special area of the law. There is
a growing trend towards establishing specialized state family courts which avoid a piecemeal approach to
domestic relations matters and which instead deal with overall domestic relations problems. Such courts
can address not only child custody and visitation, but also important related issues such as child support.
We are a court of limited jurisdiction and we traditionally lack jurisdiction over domestic relation matters.
The rationale underlying this domestic relations exception is a historically ingrained limitation because
“domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.” We find
no reason to deviate from this history and move domestic relations litigation to federal court. 175

The reality is that, to the extent Bromley's complaint failed on a purely legal basis, it would have been his failure to
establish rights of access or, as a factual matter, his appropriate exercise thereof *726 under the Texas custody decree.
That, however, was not what guided the district court's reasoning. Instead, the district court imported the domestic
relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction into a case clearly involving a federal question. 176 In 1992, six
years before Bromley, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that the so-called “domestic relations” exception was a
rule of statutory interpretation, not an independent exception to federal jurisdiction that flowed through constitutional
ratification and thereby imposing an unwritten limitation on Article Ill's jurisdictional grants. 177
The district court nevertheless allocated the Bromley matter to state court based on the same rationales underlying the
domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction and citing both Third Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedent
on the issue. 178 It would be possible to interpret the order as a simple mistake. Federal judges, like state judges, do
err on occasion. Even if it were a mistake, it would be difficult to square with the decisions that followed at both the
district court and appellate level.
In Teijeiro Fernandez v. Yeager, the plaintiff father brought both return and access claims. 179 After determining that
the plaintiff had acquiesced in the removal of his children, the district court determined that it had no jurisdiction to
hear his access claims, specifically citing Ankenbrandt:
Given the absence of any specific remedy for rights of access, this Court believes that matters relating
to access are best left to the state courts, which are more experienced in resolving these issues. As courts
of limited jurisdiction, federal courts have traditionally recognized an exception to diversity jurisdiction
when an action involves the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or custody decree. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards
.... The relief sought by Petitioner in this case comes directly within the “domestic relations exception”
because Petitioner is seeking assistance in enforcing his custody rights. While federal courts undoubtedly
have jurisdiction under the Convention and ICARA to act in cases where children have been wrongfully
removed by ordering their return to their country of habitual residence, access issues, which *727 require
the court to weigh the children's interests, the parents' interests, and other familial considerations, are best
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left to the state courts, “which have both the experience and resources to deal with this special area of the
law.” Petitioner is not left without recourse to protect his right of access because Petitioner may seek relief
in the matter pending in Kalamazoo County Circuit Court. That court has previously addressed visitation
issues and has jurisdiction to determine the terms and conditions of Petitioner's right of access. 180

In Cantor v. Cohen, the Fourth Circuit similarly declined to exercise jurisdiction over access claims, opining that:
[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters.
With the exception of the limited matters of international child abduction or wrongful removal claims,
which is expressly addressed by the Convention and ICARA, other child custody matters, including access
claims, would be better handled by the state courts which have the experience to deal with this specific area
of the law. 181

In Croll v. Croll, the Second Circuit implicitly adopted the rationale of Bromley, concluding that unless the plaintiff
were exercising rights of custody, the district court had no authority to order the return of the child to Hong Kong. 182
In that case, the plaintiff father argued that his right under the Hong Kong custody decree to prevent the child from
traveling was effectively a right of custody, 183 an assertion eventually vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott
v. Abbott. 184 Even without the custody claim, *728 however, the district court was premised in part on assuring his
“reasonable access.” 185 Instead of remanding the matter to the district court to tailor a remedy appropriate to the access
claim, the Second Circuit dismissed the case altogether for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 186 Yet the court noted
that, under a Massachusetts state court case, Viragh v. Foldes, an appropriate remedy might be ordering the defendant
to pay the plaintiff's cost to visit his child. 187
To be sure, at least one federal district court has determined that “[g]iven the language of the statute, this Court finds
that it has jurisdiction to enforce Petitioner's rights of access” as long as those children resided in the federal district. 188
The Second Circuit affirmed, but did so after ordering the return of the children to Turkey, thus arguably rendering
the decision moot for the access issue itself (it analyzed the visitation issue in the course of resolving a fee dispute) and
at best dicta if not. 189 In Taveras v. Taveraz, the Sixth Circuit rejected jurisdiction over access claims, but somewhat
inexplicably suggested that the treaty did not impart judicially enforceable access rights, but ICARA did. 190 In any
case, the overwhelming number of federal district and appellate courts considering the issue have resolved against federal
jurisdiction over access claims largely citing state court familiarity with visitation orders. Although ICARA makes clear
that a petitioner may pursue, *729 in federal or state court, “an action for arrangements for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access” and an action for return after a wrongful removal or retention, federal courts have
determined that, because the treaty lacks a specific remedy for violation of access rights, the federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction entirely. 191
The treaty's provisions do speak at greater length to judicial conduct governing return actions than access actions. 192
Even if it were the case that the treaty exclusively committed access rights to “Central Authorities”--the U.S. State
Department as opposed to judicial authorities-- that reading would apply equally to federal and state courts. 193 Federal
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courts have not, however, ruled that ICARA does not vest courts with jurisdiction over access claims. Indeed, it would
be difficult to do so given the statutory language.
2. The Abstention Dilemma
Federal court decisions to allocate visitation claims to state courts are in part a result of the strong position taken by
federal appellate courts with respect to abstention in return cases. Because abstention is strongly disfavored, and in many
cases a legal impossibility under binding circuit precedent, federal district courts assert jurisdictional grounds for refusing
visitation claims, even though there are often parallel state proceedings and it would be more consistent with ICARA and
the Constitution to abstain in favor of those proceedings where visitation claims under the treaty are already at issue. 194
With respect to federal interests under the treaty, the application of abstention is consistent with the treaty's requirement
that *730 wrongful removal claims be adjudicated expeditiously. 195 The United States is among the slowest contracting
states with respect to the resolution of claims. 196 Even in cases where the state's interests focus on a generalized concern
with custody adjudications, Colorado River abstention may be the best way to promote the treaty's purpose of rapid
adjudication. 197 Raising (or re-raising) a Hague Child Abduction Convention claim in federal court adds to the delay in
a treaty that contemplates a six-week adjudication period. 198 The Barzilay and Holder cases provide good illustrations.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Barzilay children's habitual residence was Missouri
on April 2, 2010, two and a half years after the state trial court had reached the same conclusion. 199 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Holder children were not habitual residents of Germany on December
9, 2004, nearly three years after the decision of the California appellate panel. 200
State interests in Hague Child Abduction Convention cases take a stronger form than generalized interests in child
custody. In Witherspoon v. Orange County Department of Social Services, the state agency participated in the litigation in
its role of protecting children from domestic abuse. 201 The state plaintiff, losing her treaty claim in state court, filed her
federal treaty claim after the state appellate court had vacated the trial court order. 202 Under current law, abstention
alternatives available to the federal district court are limited and heavily scrutinized. 203 In the Seventh and *731 Eighth
Circuits, Younger abstention would not be available to safeguard the state's interest in protecting minors from abuse, and
in the Ninth Circuit--where the suit originated--neither Colorado River nor Rooker-Feldman would permit abstention
based on judicial economy, Congressional intent with adjudication of treaty claims in state court, or the existence of a
state return order (because it had been vacated). 204
The requirement that federal and state courts give full faith and credit to each other's grant or denial of return orders
cannot mean that Congress intended federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Hague Child Abduction Convention
claims brought in state court up to the point that the trial court grants or denies a petition. 205
Federal appellate courts' dicta that custody interests alone cannot justify abstention are almost certainly correct. 206 By
its terms, the treaty separates habitual residence and custody determinations, despite the significant overlap between
the factual findings necessary to determine both. 207 Federal appellate courts have used this distinction to suggest that
because the treaty does not allow a court to adjudicate the merits of a custody dispute before a decision on return, the
statutory scheme opens only a narrow window for state court jurisdiction. 208 The effect of this line of reasoning is to
upend the legislative purpose behind state court jurisdiction in the first place. 209 Instead of using state courts' general

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

16

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF..., 41 N.C. J. Int'l L. 691

authority and expertise in child custody adjudications as a reason to vest them with original jurisdiction over Hague Child
Abduction Convention claims, it is used to strip away treaty claims *732 to federal court, often with the disruptive,
dilatory, and fracturing effects abstention was fashioned to prevent. 210 In short, because state courts deal with child
custody, they cannot be trusted to deal with child custody. 211 Unless, paradoxically, the treaty issue is one of access, in
which case their expertise in child custody becomes a decisive issue for determining federal jurisdiction. 212
3. ICARA and the Legacy of the Domestic Relations Exception
Because there is scant statutory basis under ICARA for federal courts to refuse to hear visitation claims, the best
reading of federal courts' treatment of access claims is an invocation of the “domestic relations exception” to federal
jurisdiction. 213 Indeed, many courts have explicitly referred to state courts' competency in “domestic relations” matters
when declining jurisdiction and have cited Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the U.S. Supreme Court's last decision interpreting
the source and scope of the so-called domestic relations exception. 214
In Ankenbrandt, the mother of two minor children sued her ex-husband, the children's father, and his new spouse, in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, for abuse allegedly committed against the girls while in
his care. 215 While the suit met the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the action under
the “domestic relations exception” to federal jurisdiction and, in the alternative, abstained from adjudication based on
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris. 216 The Supreme Court determined that the “domestic relations
exception”--which applies to divorce, maintenance, and child custody orders-- was a rule of interpretation *733 of
the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, not an independent exception to federal jurisdiction that flowed through
constitutional ratification and thereby imposing an unwritten limitation on Article Ill's jurisdictional grants. 217 Nor was
there a parallel state proceeding, which would justify abstention under Younger or, for that matter, any other abstention
doctrine. 218 The suit was plainly an action in tort which met the requisite diversity requirements and happened to involve
a divorced couple. 219
The Supreme Court did not directly address the applicability of its decision to the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, although the phrase it interpreted in Ankenbrandt, “all civil actions” is precisely the same. 220 In a number of
contexts like the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, habeas corpus, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts are divided
as to whether the “domestic relations exception” applies under Section 1331. 221 In each of the aforementioned contexts
there is substantial ambiguity that *734 necessarily accompanies broadly worded statutes meant to apply to a wide
range of federally protected rights. 222 In the case of ICARA, by contrast, Congress could not have been clearer that
“where international child abduction is alleged, both the Federal and State courts should be available to resolve the
claims,” providing that both federal and state courts equally had original, concurrent jurisdiction, and elaborating a
specific scheme for both prima facie and subsequent evidentiary burdens. 223 Although there are some complicating
factors in the treaty context, like the interpretation of the treaty by other states parties, the question as to whether the
“domestic relations exception” is a function of Article III jurisdiction or a rule of statutory construction is now squarely
posed by the behavior of federal courts under the Hague Child Abduction Convention and ICARA.
In Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court noted that abstention might be useful for a “case involving elements of the domestic
relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody” specifically noting Burford and
Colorado River abstentions. 224 Despite this fairly straightforward way through the difficulties posed by concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction in the Hague Child Abduction Convention context, federal courts have gone far toward closing
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the door on all applicable abstention doctrines, as well as Rooker-Feldman, while declining jurisdiction ostensibly on the
treaty but factually on the domestic relations exception. 225
Despite what appears to be a ripe issue for U.S. Supreme Court review--a general split among federal appellate courts
on the domestic relations exception to federal question jurisdiction generally and an application of that exception to
an unambiguous federal statute specifically--the U.S. Supreme Court may have inadvertently delayed resolution of the
issue. 226 In Abbott v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a so-called ne exeat clause in a child custody
decree--which gives the non-custodial parent the right to prevent a child's travel--constituted a “right of custody” *735
under the convention. 227 Because many access claims intertwine such a right, federal courts now have more authority
to assert that an action constitutes an action for “return” rather than access.
IV. The Latent Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Future of US Participation in
Family Law Treaties 228
Yet resolution of the domestic relations exception in the federal question context generally--and treaty context
specifically--is desirable, even necessary. The increasing role of Congress and the President in areas of family law has
facilitated the U.S. government's engagement with at least three additional Hague Conference family law treaties. 229
The United States has ratified the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption (“Hague Adoption Convention”). 230 Congress passed the implementing Intercountry Adoption Act (“IAA”)
in 2000 even though the State Department has only finalized implementing regulations relatively recently. 231 The
IAA *736 explicitly preempts state laws only to the extent they are inconsistent with the IAA, and acknowledges
the particular role of state courts in regulating emigration of U.S. children to Convention countries. 232 There is
no concurrent jurisdictional statute, and private rights of action are not authorized. The existence of an extensive
federal regulatory scheme for intercountry adoption, including participation by state regulatory agencies in the
comment process, suggests that federalism questions under the treaty are more likely to center around preemption than
jurisdiction. 233
The United States has also signed the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 234 and the Convention
on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance 235 --both of which will invite
similar difficulties in drawing the boundary between national interests in the treaty's observance and state interests in
the treaty's underlying legal problems (if there is legislation at the federal level). As Ann Laquer *737 Estin has noted,
harmonization of these treaties with domestic U.S. law will be difficult because of “our approach to federalism and
the traditional role of state governments in family law.” 236 This entire picture becomes even more muddled once we
consider the potentially preemptive effect of federal common law, 237 which is now being developed with respect to the
Hague Child Abduction Convention. 238
The Hague Child Abduction Convention may be viewed, in part, as a victory for bicameral international lawmaking. 239
The large Congressional majorities behind the implementing legislation represent an underlying interest by states in
increasing the tools available to reach abducted children. 240 Compared to federal judges, state judges have applied
the treaty with an understanding of the importance of mutuality and reciprocity in making sure child *738 custody is
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adjudicated in the appropriate forum. 241 A similarly inclusive process governed the ratification of the Hague Adoption
Convention. 242
Yet the treaty has not been a story of the success of judicial federalism. Without wading into the much wider (and
more perilous) debate surrounding the use of legislative history for purposes of statutory interpretation, it is fair to say
that federal appellate courts have been relatively indifferent to the implicit Congressional admonition as to state family
law interests and the explicit grant of original jurisdiction over petitions brought under the treaty. 243 This indifference
appears motivated in substantial measure by a suggested but forceful view of the relationship between federal courts and
the rights imparted by treaties. 244 If the United States is to continue to enter into treaties that fundamentally change or
limit states' authority over family law--and assuming Congress means what it says about state interests--it will need to
either structure Article III jurisdiction more carefully or consider other alternatives. 245
Indeed, federal treaties may not even be preferable given some *739 contracting states' poor records with respect to
Hague Child Abduction Convention enforcement. 246 State executive agencies and law enforcement have successfully
negotiated bilateral agreements with foreign sovereign states for some time--a practice that, at least impliedly, proceeds
with Congressional approval. 247 If, however, federal treaties continue to dominate the future of transnational family
dispute resolution, then greater attention to the jurisdictional divide between state and federal courts in implementing
legislation is warranted.
V. Conclusion
The historical divisions between state and federal judicial competencies face mounting pressures as the legal dimensions
to the American family continue to federalize. Even under Abbott, federal courts are obligated to undertake fairly
searching analyses of the content of foreign and domestic child custody decrees and make difficult decisions as to the
remedies available to parents once those analyses are concluded. It is no longer the case that federal judges may be
free of issues related to child custody, family maintenance obligations, and divorce as long as Congress views federal
courts as legitimate fora to adjudicate claims arising under U.S. treaties. One option is to squarely decide that Article
III jurisdiction never contemplated matters traditionally handled by ecclesiastical courts, a matter of some historical
debate. 248 A second option is for Congress to confine jurisdiction under future treaties *740 to either federal or state
courts, a course which would at least eliminate delays and costs associated with piecemeal and repetitive litigation,
although it would also bring to the forefront the latent feud in Article III as to whether Congress may so deprive federal
courts of rights arising under treaties. 249 A third option is for Congress to establish a specialized court to adjudicate
petitions, as many other countries have done. 250 Whatever the future resolution, it is clear that Congress and the federal
judiciary must squarely address whether those matters asserted to be “domestic relations” are fundamentally outside the
province of federal courts and, if not, what that conclusion means for Congress' plan to ensure U.S. commitments under
future family law treaties are upheld. 251
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ICARA, 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2014).

93

Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 37
(2006) (“All three of these issues (habitual residence, wrongful removal, and right of custody), may easily become inextricably
tangled.”).

94

89 F. App'x. 285, 285-86 (1st Cir. 2004).

95

Id.

96

See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).

97

Witherspoon v. Orange Cry. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (CD. Cal. 2009).

98

Ion Hazzikostas, Note, Federal Court Abstention and the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 432
(2004).

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

26

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF..., 41 N.C. J. Int'l L. 691

99

420 U.S. 592, 611-13 (1969).

100

442 U.S. 415 (1979). In Pennzoil v. Texaco, the U.S. Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to a state's fundamental
interest in “administering certain aspects of their judicial systems.” 481 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1987). In 2013, the U.S. Supreme
Court narrowed the applicability of Younger in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, although it appears that even within its
narrower confines it would easily protect actions by state agencies to protect children as in Witherspoon. 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013).

101

While it has not yet come before a district court, Burford abstention may also be warranted given the specialized courts many
states have established to adjudicate family law claims, the conditions under which state departments of child, family, and
social services are authorized to intervene on behalf of children, and the allocation of jurisdiction between juvenile courts,
family courts, and general jurisdiction trial courts. See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06 (1992)
(“It is not inconceivable, however, that in certain circumstances, the abstention principles developed in Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when the parties
do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody. This would be so when a case presents ‘difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.”’ (quoting
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814)).

102

Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 16; Centenaro v. Poliero, 901 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 2009).

103

Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, No. 01 C 4685, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17095, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2001) (“Finally, the Court
notes that the proceedings here are somewhat similar because the evidence that will be used to determine whether the children
are settled in their new environment, a determination required by the Hague Convention under the present circumstances,
will also be used for the required determination of the best interests of the children in the custody proceedings.”).

104

See, e.g., Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on the Hawaii Family Court and
Hawaii Supreme Court's determinations that return of children to Canada would “pose a grave risk of psychological harm”).

105

See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Orange Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 646 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (CD. Cal. 2009) (“Federalism gives
states authority over matters of marriage, family, and child welfare. This case deals with those interests ... the state proceeding
gives Ms. Witherspoon an adequate opportunity to raise the issues she seeks to raise here in federal court.”); Cerit v. Cerit, 188
F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Haw. 2002) (ruling that it was appropriate to abstain from ruling on a Turkish man's ICARA petition
when he had already made an ICARA argument in Hawaii state court); Grieve v. Tamerin, No. 00-CV-3824 (JG), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12210 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2000) (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate where the petitioner had filed
a Hague Convention petition in state court prior to filing it in federal court). Contra Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 191 F. Supp.
2d 685, 688, 692 (E.D. Va. 2002) (criticizing Cerit and denying motion to dismiss based on abstention).

106

Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1988) (arguing that abstention should be applied when it advances federal interests).

107

See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1085, 1092 (1999) ( “But what if the federal plaintiff does not seek to enjoin the state proceeding, and state appeals are
still pending? In this case, as we have already seen, Younger does not apply, and in some states interlocutory or appealable
orders are given no preclusive effect. Here the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as it is generally used in the lower courts, seems both
necessary and appropriate.”).

108

No. 4:07CV01781 ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89304, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 4, 2007).

109

Id.

110

Id. at *1-2.

111

Id.
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112

Id. at *4.

113

Id. at *5; see also Barzilay v. Barzilay, No. 2104FC-10567-01 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2007) (Missouri Case.net).

114

Barzilay, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89304, at *5.

115

Id. at *15.
[T]he state court held that the mere presence of the minor children on vacation in Israel is insufficient to establish a ‘habitual
presence’ so as to fall under the purview of International Child Abduction Remedies Act .... While the state court does
not specifically make a finding of whether the minor children were wrongfully removed to, or wrongfully retained in, the
United States, it necessarily follows from a finding of habitual presence in the United States that the minor children were not
wrongfully removed from Israel. If the Plaintiff is not satisfied with the state court ruling, then the Plaintiff's only available
course of action is to appeal that decision.”
Id. at *13-14.

116

Id. at *10.

117

Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The controlling case in our circuit is Silverman I, which concluded that
abstention was inappropriate in Hague Convention cases.” (citing Silverman v. Silverman, 267 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 2001))).

118

Id. at 851.

119

Id. at 850 (citations omitted).

120

See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying domestic relations abstention in a suit by Romanian citizens
against California residents to determine marital status); In re D.M.T.-R, 802 N.W.2d 759, 764-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
The Minnesota court noted:
For example, the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction divests the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over child-custody decrees .... Thus, we conclude that the UCCJEA confers to state courts subject matter
jurisdiction over child-custody proceedings, including the termination of parental rights involving a child who is not a United
States citizen but who is in Minnesota.”
In re D.M.T.-R., 802 N.W.2d at 764-65.; see also Maqsudi v. Maqsudi, 830 A.2d 929 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)
(adjudicating dispute between New Jersey and Uzbekistan custody decrees).

121

Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2003). State court orders under the treaty, it determined, were limited
to those falling under 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g) (2006), now transferred to ICARA, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(g) (2014), which provides
that “full faith and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the States and the courts of the United States to the judgment
of any other such court ordering or denying the return of a child, pursuant to the Convention, in an action brought under
this Act.” Silverman, 338 F.3d at 894.

122

305 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2002).

123

Id. at 861.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id. re Holder, No. F036747, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2898, at * 13 (Cal. Ct. Ap. Mar. 20, 2002).
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130

Holder, 305 F.3d at 862.

131

Id. at 873.

132

Holder v. Holder, No. C00-1927C, 2001 WL 34787138, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 2001).

133

Holder, 305 F.3d at 860.

134

Id. at 866-67.

135

Id. at 867-68.

136

Id. In that brief, the United States argued that the Hague Abduction Convention was not meant to be used to give a litigant
an opportunity to re-litigate custody. See In re Holder, No. F036747, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2898, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 20, 2002) (“[T]he Hague Convention was not intended to allow the ‘left-behind parent’ a second bite at the custody
apple just because, after specifically electing to litigate custody in a forum that otherwise had jurisdiction the parent suffered
an adverse result.”).

137

Holder v. Holder, No. C001927C, 2003 WL 24091906 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2003).

138

Holder, 305 F.3d at 864.

139

Id. at 865 (citing Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n.55 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It clearly follows that, if a prior state court
custody order cannot bar a federal court from vacating the state court order, then it cannot bar federal adjudication of the
Hague Convention claim.”)).

140

Id. at 860.

141

Id. at 864-65.

142

In re Holder, No. F036747, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2898, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2002).

143

See Holder, 305 F.3d. at 864-65 (“[F]ederal courts adjudicating Hague Convention petitions must accord full faith and credit
only to the judgments of those state or federal courts that actually adjudicated a Hague Convention claim in accordance with
the dictates of the Convention and ICARA.” (emphasis added)).
To hold that a left-behind parent is barred ... from raising a Hague Convention claim in a subsequent federal proceeding just
because he or she did not raise it in the state custody proceeding would render the Convention an incompetent remedy for
the very problem that it was ratified to address.
Id. at 865.

144

Id. at 865.

145

Holder, 305 F.3d at 875 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United States) (unpublished brief) (“The
majority opinion ... gives the left-behind parent a windfall by providing him with two opportunities to litigate custody: once in
state court, and if he is unhappy with the result, all over again in another forum under the Hague Convention. As the United
States aptly has observed in its amicus brief filed in the state court of appeal, ‘the Hague Convention was not intended to allow
the “left-behind parent” a second bite at the custody apple just because, after specifically electing to litigate custody in a forum
that otherwise had jurisdiction, the parent suffered an adverse result.”’); see also Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra
note 3, art. 1 (“The objects of the present convention are ... to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”). The Judiciary Committee's House report noted:
[Section 11603(g)] means, for example, that if a court in one jurisdiction has ordered the return of a child and the child is
located in another jurisdiction in the United States before that order has been executed, the order shall be given full effect in
the second jurisdiction without the need to initiate a new return action there pursuant to the Convention and [ICARA].
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H.R. REP. NO. 100-525, at 12 (1988). In other words, the provision exists to reinforce the importance that a return order
under ICARA be effected with haste and to close the door on any possible delay or manipulation by the allegedly abducting
parent. It is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to create a singular exception to a large body of statutory and
common law but declined to mention this intent in any way.

146

See Holder, 305 F.3d at 867-70.

147

Id. at 867.

148

See, e.g., Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005); Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2005); Silverman
v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2003); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Justice Ginsburg effectively
advocates that position in her Garamendi dissent. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
see also E1 A1 Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 (1999) (“Our home-centered preemption analysis, therefore, should
not be applied, mechanically, in construing our international obligations.”).

149

FED. PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATT'YS § 2.8 (SHRIVER CTR. 2015), http://federalpracticemanual.Org/
node/15 [https://perma.cc/DL76-8EPS].

150

Id.

151

The Seventh Circuit announced its rule in an opinion issued on July 26, 2002, after the parties had settled, but before the court
had received notice of the settlement. Therefore, the opinion is technically advisory, but should the Seventh Circuit revisit the
issue, it is likely to accord the judgment significant weight. Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, 45 F. App'x. 535 (7th Cir. 2002).

152

Copeland v. Copeland, No. 97-1665, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 1998) (affirming district court Colorado
River abstention); Hazbun v. Rodriguez, 52 F. App'x. 207 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding district court rejection of Colorado River
and Younger abstention).

153

ICARA, 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2014); see also Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (rejecting rights asserted under
the U.N. Charter).

154

Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 16.

155

416 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2005).

156

Id.

157

See, e.g., Barzilay v. Barzilay, 536 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (reversing a district court abstention and holding that
abstention was inappropriate with Hague claims and state judicial remedies need not be exhausted); Silverman v. Silverman,
267 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing a district court abstention because abstention is only proper when the relief is
equitable or discretionary, and relief under the treaty us mandatory); Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir.
2003) (rejecting the application of Rooker-Feldman outside of the implementing statute's full faith and credit clause).

158

Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 8 (requiring an application to a Central Authority to include
information concerning the identity of the applicant, the child, and the person alleged to have removed or retained the child).
Where available, the date of birth of the child, the grounds on which the applicant's claim for return of the child is based,
and all available information relating to the whereabouts of the child and the identity of the person with whom the child is
presumed to be should be included. The application may be accompanied or supplemented by an authenticated copy of any
relevant decision or agreement, a certificate or affidavit emanating from a Central Authority, other competent authority of
the State of the child's habitual residence, or from a qualified person, concerning the relevant law of that State, and any other
relevant document. Id.

159

42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006) (transferred to 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2014)).
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160

Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,498 (Mar. 26, 1986)
(quoting Elisa Pérez-Vera, HCCH Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction).

161

See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, No. 96-6268, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18116, *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1996) (rejecting the mother's
attempt to re-litigate a Hague Child Abduction claim on the basis that “she clearly stated the source of her alleged custody
rights and the date of the alleged wrongful retention, and requested in her prayer for relief that she be allowed to return to
the United Kingdom with the four children”).

162

See, e.g., Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Grieve's claim implicates a paramount federal interest in foreign
relations and the enforcement of United States treaty obligations. Deference to a state court's interest in the outcome of a child
custody dispute would be particularly problematic in the context of a Hague Convention claim inasmuch as the Convention
divests the state of jurisdiction over these custody issues until the merits of the Hague Convention claim have been resolved.”).

163

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 383 (2006) ( “[U]niformity is an important goal of treaty interpretation.”); Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The great object of an international
agreement is to define the common ground between sovereign nations.”); Vicki Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 303, 356 (2006) (“A basic premise of the constitutional system has long been that appellate review of state court
decisions is particularly important where treaty rights are asserted, both to assure a uniformity of interpretation and to
minimize the possibilities of error in sensitive areas affecting foreign relations.”).

164

March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001); In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (detailing how Perry
March murdered his wife then fled to Mexico to escape criminal prosecution and civil liability, lost custody battles with the
maternal grandparents in Illinois and Tennessee courts, and then used the Hague Child Abduction Convention to have the
children returned to Mexico).

165

Id. at 472.

166

Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, No. 01-3928, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17661 (7th Cir. July 26, 2002), vacated pursuant to settlement
agreement, 45 F. App'x 535 (7th Cir. 2002).

167

Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002). The court noted:
In light of the Hague Convention policy that signatory countries should return wrongfully removed children expeditiously
and through any appropriate remedy, we reject the claim that a left-behind parent is precluded or barred from raising his
Hague Convention claim in the court of his choice, or that “wise judicial administration” is furthered by staying a federal
Hague petition, simply because that left-behind parent has pursued the return of his children through multiple legal avenues.
Id. at 863.

168

Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,514 (Mar. 26, 1986).

169

Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“no federal court has yet addressed the right of access to children
under the Convention as contrasted with ordering the return of children.”).

170

Id. at 860-61.

171

Id. at 860 (quoting Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 21).

172

Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 21.

173

Id. art. 29.

174

ICARA, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(B) (2014).
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175

Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 861-62 (citing Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930)); see also Solomon v.
Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021-24 (3d Cir. 1975); Gill v. Gill, 412 F.Supp. 1153, 1156-57 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

176

Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 862.

177

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 699-701 (1992).

178

Agler, 280 U.S. at 383-84; Solomon, 516 F.2d at 1021-24.

179

121 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1119 (W.D. Mich. 2000).

180

Id. at 1126 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 693); see also Davis v. Strout, No. 07-CV-141-GZS, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 75272,
at *4 (D. Me. Oct. 9, 2007) (“These courts have indicated that state court is the appropriate forum to redress violations of
rights of access under the Hague Convention.”); Wiezel v. Wiezel-Tyrnauer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[S]tate
courts are the preferred forum for resolving access issues.”); Neng Nhia Yi Ly v. Heu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (D. Minn.
2003); Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).

181

442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980)).

182

229 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000).

183

Id. at 139 (“Mr. Croll reasons that a ne exeat clause[, which grants a veto power over the child's place of residence,] gives
an otherwise non-custodial parent a power that amounts to a ‘right to determine the child's place of residence’ and thereby
creates a ‘right of custody’ that is protected by the Convention's return remedy.”).

184

560 U.S. 1, 20-21 (2010) (“To interpret the Convention to permit an abducting parent to avoid a return remedy, even when
the other parent holds a ne exeat right, would run counter to the onvention's purpose of deterring child abductions by parents
who attempt to find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial disputes.”).

185

Croll, 229 F.3d at 145 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Croll v. Chiu, No. 7211 of 1998, Order at 1 (Dist. Ct. H.K. Spec.
Admin. Reg., Feb. 23, 1999)).

186

Id. at 135, 143-44.

187

Id. at 135, 137-38 (citing Viragh v. Foldes, 415 Mass. 96, 109-10 (1993)).

188

In re S.E.O., 873 F. Supp. 2d 536, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Given the language of the statute, this Court finds that it has
jurisdiction to enforce Petitioner's rights of access to the Children, and orders Respondent to comply with the visitation rights
set forth by the Turkish Court's May 13, 2011, Order, so long as the Children remain in the United States.”). The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion in In re S.E.O., but recast the case as a custody rights case. See Ozaltin v.
Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013).

189

See Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 378 (holding that due to the language of the statute, the Court has jurisdiction to grant Petitioner
access to the Children in question based on the visitation rights mandated in the Turkish Court).

190

477 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2007). In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit implied that rights of access could be vindicated
in federal district courts, but the court later clarified that no such remedy was available, in Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196,
205-06 (4th Cir. 2006). Katona v. Kovacs, 148 F. App'x. 158, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2005).

191

Croll, 229 F.3d at 135 (“Because courts in the United States have jurisdiction to enforce the Convention by ordering a child's
return to her habitual residence only if the child has been removed in breach of a petitioning parent's custodial rights, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to order return in this case.”); Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202-05 (4th Cir. 2006).

192

Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, arts. 12-20.
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193

Id. art. 21.

194

Krehbiel v. Cooper No. 1:08CV276, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98789 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (parallel proceedings in North
Carolina state court); Wagner v. Wagner, No. RWT 07-1347, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45720 (D. Md. June 21, 2007) (parallel
proceedings in Maryland state court); In re Adams ex. rel. Naik v. Naik, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (proceedings
in Illinois state court).

195

See Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.

196

Lesh, supra note 91.

197

Hazzikostas, supra note 98, at 424.

198

Halabi, supra note 1, at 184.

199

See Barzilay v. Barzilay, No. 2104FC-10567-01 (St. Louis Cty. Oct. 16, 2007) (Missouri Case.net) (rejecting Sagi Barzilay's
request for return); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding district court determination that Israel was
not children's habitual residence).

200

See In re Holder, No. F036747, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2898 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2002) (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that Jeremiah Holder waived his Hague Convention claim); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding federal district court determination that Germany was not the Holder children's habitual residence).

201

646 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1177 (CD. Cal. 2009).

202

Id. at 1178-79.

203

Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 202 (“[T]he federal court has generally found that abstention is not appropriate.”).

204

In Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis, which did not involve Younger abstention, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the doctrine would
be inapplicable to Hague Child Abduction Convention claims. The district court in Witherspoon emphasized that the state
interest justifying Younger abstention was dependency, not custody. Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.
2005).

205

Yang, 416 F.3d at 203 (“It is clear that if the state proceeding is one in which the petitioner has raised, litigated and been given
a ruling on the Hague Convention claims, any subsequent ruling by the federal court on the same issues would constitute
interference.”).

206

See id. at 204.

207

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993).

208

See id. at 1400.

209

KTLPATRICK TOWNSEND, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE
HAGUE CONVENTION 69 (2012), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/HagueLitigationGuide/hague-litigation-guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW78-6R7D].

210

Id.

211

Id. The U.S. Supreme Court's only decision regarding the treaty, Abbott v. Abbott, was necessary because federal appellate
courts determined with one exception that a non-custodial parent's right to prevent a custodial parent's foreign travel did not
give the left-behind parent a right to demand return of a child. 560 U.S. 1 (2010).

212

Id.
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